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Dr. Gilruth's presentations traced the origins of
our manned space program, and Dr. Mueller's, the
path upon which we have firmly placed our feet. In
preparing this paper, which attempts to describe the
V" development of the Apollo spacecraft, I was reminded
of a New Yorker cartoon of several years ago. The
scene was ancient Egypt, during the period when
the Pharaohs were taking advantage of the latest
scientific breakthrough to erect their new monuments.
At the foot of a half-completed pyramid, a train of
hundreds of workers was pulling one of the large
stones into place under the baleful eye of the con-
struction foreman, dutifully outfitted with hard hat
and whip. In the traces, one of the laborers was
saying to his partner, who had obviously been grum-
bling, " Stop your complaining. Don't you realize
that it's a privilege to be associated with a project
this vast ?"
The Apollo spacecraft are the apex of the lunar
program pyramid--the top 90 feet of the 375-foot-
high vehicle which some day in this decade will rise
majestically from the pad at Cape Kennedy, pro-
pelling three of our more adventurous citizens to
their historic rendezvous with the Moon.
There are today over 130,000 Americans laboring
"in the traces" to make this dream a reality. Al-
though the goal of the program provides an overlay
of glamour, the work is the same type of hard, de-
tailed, technical development task which we have
been tackling in this country to meet defense or space
goals over the last three decades.
The main difference comes from the fact that the
space environment, coupled with the demands of the
lunar mission, is terribly unforgiving. Any design
or quality deficiency in the spacecraft or any of its
subsystems will be sure to appear some time during
the 2-week mission, causing, at the very least, an abort,
and, at the worst, tragedy. Although we have pro-
vided redundant backup for critical systems aboard
the spacecraft, our emphasis is on developing each
system to the point where it will not malfunction.
Fortunately, the Space Age has matured to the stage
where we understand the environment; we understand
how to design to meet it; we understand how to test
in our Earth-bound laboratories to determine defi-
ciencies which otherwise would be found during
flight tests.
This maturing of our understanding has shaped
our entire program. The lunar effort began in 1961.
The first major contract awarded was to the Instru-
mentation Laboratory at Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) for development of the guidance
and navigation system. In December of that year,
North American Aviation, Inc., was awarded develop-
ment of the command and service modules. Almost
a year later, the lunar orbit rendezvous approach to
the overall mission was selected, and Grumman was
brought onto the team to develop the lunar excursion
module. Almost a year and a half of detailed study
had been devoted to defining the mission and develop-
ing the specifications for the necessary system ele-
ments.
The development program has proceeded with
similar deliberation. The command and service mod-
ules, and their subsystems, have been in design and
developmental test for almost 21/2 years. The fruits
of this effort are just beginning to ripen. Last month
the first functional Apollo guidance system was quali-
fied in Cambridge, Mass. In May the launch escape
system and the Earth landing system will be tested
under flight conditions with a boilerplate spacecraft
at White Sands. A few days later, a command and
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service module, again of boilerplate construction, will
be launched from Cape Kennedy atop a Saturn I
to check our calculations of the aerodynamic loads
which will be encountered during launch. These two
flight tests mark the gradual transition of the program
from the developmental phase, where we work out
the early design problems, to the qualification phase
where we prove that the design is indeed worthy of
flight. The focus is the first launch of a complete
command service module aboard a Saturn IB early
in 1966.
If there is any one thing that sets the manned space
_/ flight program apart from other, apparently similar,
development programs, it is the rigor with which we
execute the ground test program. The guidelines we
use are simple:
1. Test hardware as early as possible.
2. Make procedures rigorous.
3. Provide consistent test plans and procedures.
4. Provide responsive malfunction investigations.
5. Provide accurate configuration control.
6. Conduct test readiness review.
7. Analyze results; report concisely and quickly.
8. No testing with unresolved anomalies.
In a way, these guidelines sound like a litany of good
generalizations, but we take them literally. Every
failure encountered in ground testing must be under-
stood and corrected before the spacecraft is certified
for flight. This program discipline--the refusal to
shoot and hope--should make our flight tests demon-
strations of the fact that we have solved our prob-
lems on the ground. The only failures which should
be encountered in flight are those which can arise
from a combination of environments which we were
unable to simulate in our laboratories. Since there
are still several such conditions, we cannot expect a
perfect record_but the success ratio should be rela-
tively high.
The flow of the overall program is shown in figure
1 The early command (CM) and service modules
(SM) are injected into earth orbit by a Saturn IB
to certify the spacecraft and work out crew operations
for periods up to 14 days. About a year later, the
lunar excursion module (LEM) is added to the stack
for its initial flight test. Subsequent tests will work
out the rendezvous procedures between the two space-
craft and simulate the lunar mission without ever leav-
ing Earth orbit.
These tests will take place at the same time that the
Saturn V, the massive vehicle required to place the
fully fueled spacecraft on the trajectory to the Moon,
is being developed and flight tested. Thus the
parallel testing paths will provide a spacecraft and
booster which, when mated, will be ready to consum-
mate the lunar mission.
One of these national conferences would not be
complete without at least a brief description of that
mission. Since last year we have concentrated on
filling in the detail around the nominal lunar orbit
rendezvous mode. Since the Earth-Moon geometry
varies continuously, many trajectories must be devel-
oped in our computers to be sure that all essential
conditions can be covered by our design.
The particular trajectory shown in figures 2 to 4
is for May 6, 1968. (This is not an announcement
of intent, merely an example.) For operational rea-
sons we wish the launch and Earth landing to take
place during daylight, and the lunar landing to occur
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FIGURE 1.--Apollo spacecraft test program.
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when the &n is 4% degrees above the lunar horizon, 
to provide optimm? lighting conditions for control of 
touchdown. Table I is a possible schedule of another 
possible mission. 
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FIGURE 2.-Earth launch phase of typical 
lunar mission profile. 
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FIGURE 3.-Lunar landing phase of typical 
lunar mission profile. 
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FIGURE 4.-Lunar launch phase of typical 
lunar mission profile. 
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TABLE I.-Mission Schedule 
Monday -... -. 
ruesday .. .-- 
Thursday..-. 
Friday.. _ _ _ _ _  
Saturday .... 
Tuesday .... 
Cape 
time 
1:32 p.m.- 
3:50 p.m.- 
1 : O O  am.. 
7:30 a.m.. 
9: 30 a.m.. 
1:50  p.m.- 
3102 p m . .  
3:02 p.m.. 
4:02 p.m.. 
8:02 p.m.. 
1: 30 p.m.. 
2:02 p.m. 
4:02 p.m. 
4: 38 p.m. 
4: 50 pm.  
.aunch: pad A, com- 
plex 39, 72' launch 
azimuth. 
Had 21/2-hr launch 
window but made 
it right on nom- 
inal time. Trans- 
lunar trajectory 
<18' relative to 
Moon orbital 
plane. 
12 min to orbit. 
3ocking completed 
First midcourse. 
3nal midcourse. 
lunar orbit insertion 
behind Moon. 
LEM retro. 
Lunar touchdown. 
Lunar launch. 
Rendezvous behind 
Moon. 
I'rans-Earth injection 
behind Moon. 
First midcourse. 
Final midcourse. 
Jettison service 
module. 
Parachute deploy. 
Touchdown in Pacific 
at 12:50 p.m. 
Honolulu time. 
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FIGURE 5.-Suggested lunar landing areas. 
Figure 5 is a map of possible lunar landing areas. 
The lunar landing site was arbitrarily selected, but 
represents the gneral area in which we can expect to 
explore. Later missions may stay somewhat longer 
than 24 hours on the Moon’s surface, and up to 7 
days in lunar orbit. 
The Earth landing area will, in general, be the 
Pacific Ocean. On this particular mission it is about 
400 nautical miles north east of Hawaii. The exact 
point of touchdown will depend on the exact mission 
flown and the other constraints placed on the flight. 
In summary, much has been accomplished since 
1961-much more must yet occur before the com- 
mand module splashes down, still warm from its tri- 
umphant reentry. Important as that splash will be, 
in a sense, it will be an anticlimax. As Havelock 
Ellis said once, about philosophy, “It is not the attain- 
ment of goals that matters; it is the things that are 
met with on the way.” On the way to the Moon we 
will meet, and solve, all the problems which stand 
between us and mastery of space. The heritage of 
the lunar program will not be merely the lunar rock 
we bring back, but rather the Apollo space ships and 
launch vehicles, coupled with a broad-based national 
team capable of coping with any and all requirements 
for operations in space which may be thrust upon 
this Nation. 
The past year has seen much progress in the devel- 
opment of the spacecraft. W e  are on the schedule 
and within the budget discussed at this conference 
last year. W e  hope to be able to report increasing 
accomplishment within those same two constraints 
next year and.each succeeding year until, in 1970, 
we can, as Dr. Gilruth did with Mercury, summarize 
how it was done. 
